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INVESTMENT AND COMMERCIAL CRIME IN
THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
Scott D. Syfert*
MAYOR: "No man is without sin. It's God's will, and it is no use
the free-thinkers arguing about it. "
JUDGE: "Well there are sins and sins. I freely admit I take bribes, but
what sort of bribes? Borzoi puppies, that's all!"
- The Government Inspector, Nikolai Gogol (1836)**
I. INTRODUCTION
In a mere six years, the states that once constituted the Soviet Union
were transformed from implacable ideological and strategic adversaries of
the West into European partners, democracies, and emerging markets.
Before our very eyes, the nations that once constituted the gravest threats
to the capitalist system set out to remake their political and economic
systems in emulation of it.
Educated Western reactions to the democratization of the former Soviet
Union has been, to put it charitably, schizophrenic. Depending upon which
commentator one chose to listen to, Russia (as the largest and most
powerful nation-state to emerge from the rubble of the Soviet Union) was
either (a) on the verge of an economic take-off which would result in a
* G.C., London School of Economics (1990); M.A., University of Virginia (1994); B.A.,
(1991), J.D. (1997) University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Mr. Syfert is an associate
in the International Division at Parker, Poe, Adams & Bernstein L.L.P. in Charlotte who
specializes in corporate law and international business transactions.
** NIKOLAI GOGOL, THE GOVERNMENT INSPECTOR 26 (Heinemann Educational Books
1987) (1834).
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booming Russian economy, or (b) on the verge of economic catastrophe,
which would result in a collapsing Russian state. These were the two poles
between which policymakers, corporate attorneys, and opinion-makers in
the West oscillated. And, depending upon the expert and time-frame, each
contradictory opinion appeared equally plausible.
As a result, Western investment in Russia since perestroika has been
similarly haphazard and schizophrenic. Large institutional investors and
multinational corporations (such as ABB and GE) began operations in
Russia, often with success. In the summer of 1997, the Russian stock
market was the fastest growing in the world, and Western investment
bankers were scrambling to get in; there was, as the headline in The
Economist put it, "Plenty to Go Round. "I Today, of course, investors are
scrambling to get out and the optimistic market projections of a year ago
appear foolish or naive.
What happened? Financial explanations are scattered and uncertain.
The schizophrenia that besets Western projections of Russia's future infects
the economic post-mortem of the autumn of 1998.
One emerging coherent explanation of Russia's roller-coaster economy
since 1991 points to the unbridled corruption of the Russian market, and its
nefarious effects on the Russian economy, state and society. The
phenomenon of the gangster-state (or of oligarchical capitalism) as an
explanation of Russia's economic collapse is now receiving attention from
Russia experts worldwide. The impact of Russian corruption, and its
effects on Western investment, which is so critical to Russia's economic
rejuvenation, is the subject of this Article.
Part II will introduce Western perceptions of Russia's reform and
transition: from optimism at the collapse of communism; to pessimism once
the economic hardships of reform grew; to the optimism of 1995-1998 once
the Russian economy began to expand; and lastly to the current gloom of
the banking collapse of August 1998.
Part III will discuss Western investment in the Russian market: the
amounts and types of foreign direct investment, the governing corporate
law, and the vehicles used for structuring such investments. Part IV will
move from the legal aspects of business planning in Russia to the more
practical aspects of business in Russia. It will highlight issues Western
investors should be conversant with regarding the nature and scope of
Russian commercial crime. This section will show how the economic
system of the Soviet Union created the conditions necessary for corruption
to flourish, and what effects commercial crime is having in Russia and
1. Russian Finance: Plenty To Go Round, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 9, 1997.
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beyond. Part V will analyze the legal and political mechanisms currently
being employed to contain corruption. Finally, Part VI summarizes some
lessons learned by Western businesses coping with the lucrative, but
dangerous, Russian marketplace.
II. INVESTING IN RUSSIA: HANG ON FOR THE RIDE
Although investing in Russia in the fall of 1998 appears reckless and
dangerous, it was not always so. Just over a year ago, the Russian stock
exchange was booming, investors were scrambling to get in, and optimism
reigned. In light of the banking and currency crises of September 1998,
and the appointment of ex-Soviet apparatchik Yevgeny Primakov to power,
bleak pessimism has once again set in regarding Russia's prospects. Yet,
it is worth remembering that few things change as frequently, or
dramatically, as Russia's prospects.
A. The Case for Pessimism
Ever since the formal dissolution of the Soviet Union was orchestrated
by the leaders of Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine at Belovezhskaya Pushcha
on December 7, 1991,2 Western observers have watched and waited
anxiously for an authoritarian counter-revolution that would undo the liberal
reforms of the last decade, and restore an authoritarian regime. As one
expert put it, "a cottage industry of doom-predictors" sprang up with the
demise of the Soviet Union.' Many experienced observers such as Henry
Kissinger,4 Richard Pipes, 5 and Zbigniew Brzezinski6 shared, in many
respects, what became a common and widely-held view. They believed that
2. For a discussion of the negotiations between Russian President Boris Yeltsin,
Belarussian President Stanislav Shushkevich, and Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk
leading up the dissolution of the Soviet State, see DAVID REMNICK, RESURRECTION: THE
STRUGGLE FOR A NEW RUSSIA 19-29 (1997). •
3. Anders Aslund, Why the Doomsayers Are Wrong About Russia, WEEKLY STANDARD,
Dec. 29, 1997/Jan. 5, 1998, at 24.
4. See generally Henry Kissinger, Beware: A Threat Abroad, NEWSWEEK, June 17, 1996,
at 41.
5. See generally Richard Pipes, Russia's Past, Russia's Future, COMMENTARY, June
1996, at 35. See also Richard Pipes, Is Russia Still An Enemy?, FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Sept./Oct. 1997, at 65.
6. See generally Zbigniew Brzezinski, Russia: Neither our Partner nor Patient,
WASHINGTON TIMES, Dec. 22, 1995.
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Russia's "imperial consciousness" was not dead,7 and given time, the forces
opposing democracy and reform would gather strength and gradually gain
influence in Russian foreign and domestic policy.' The result would be a
new, and potentially dangerous, tyranny in Moscow. One noted analyst
wrote, in a fairly representative sample of this school: "Russia's alienation
from the West... could easily contribute to its empire-building tendencies.
It may not take too much time or effort to see Russian tanks on the Polish
border again .... "'
Predictions varied as to how this tyranny would occur, or the shape it
would take. Some believed that a "Red-Brown" coalition of right-wing
nationalists, neo-fascists, and former Communists would take power.1°
Others, such as Nobel Laureate Alexander Solzhenitsyn, believed that
democracy was inherently unsuited for Russia after decades of Communist
rule, and that democratic institutions would simply collapse, as the
Provisional Government had in 1917 before the Bolshevik onslaught."
Many believed an outright coup led by disgruntled military officers and
sympathetic nationalists was the likely outcome. 2 Finally, there were those
who believed the cycles of Russian history portended periods of liberal
reform, which then failed and were followed by periods of extreme counter-
reform and reaction.' 3 These observers believed this pattern would repeat
7. See Stephen Sestanovich, Geotherapy: Russia 's Neuroses, and Ours, NAT'L INTEREST,
Fall 1996, at 4.
8. For one analysis of how right-wing Russian factions would eventually crush liberal
reform, See ALEXANDER YANOV, THE RUSSIAN CHALLENGE & THE YEAR 2000 (Iden
Rosenthal, Trans., 1987).
9. Dimiti Simes, quoted in Aslund, supra note 3, at 24.
10. See generally WALTER LAQUEUR, BLACK HUNDRED: THE RISE OF THE EXTREME
RIGHT IN RUSSIA (1993).
11. See ALEXANDER SOLZHENIrSYN, LETTER TO SOVIET LEADERS 52 (Hilary Sternberg,
Trans., 1974). In an open letter to the Politburo, Solzhenitsyn wrote that "[a] sudden
reintroduction [of parliamentary democracy] would merely be a melancholy repetition of
1917." Id.
12. See Vladimir Klimenko, The Coup Next Time, MOTHER JONES, Nov./Dec. 1991, at
49.
13. For an explanation of this schemata, see generally YANOV, supra note 8. See also
Alexander Yanov, In the Grip of the Adversarial Paradigm, in REFORM IN RUSSIA AND THE
USSR 156, 159 (Robert Crummey ed., 1989). In Russia, Yanov wrote,
[T]he ancien regime is reestablished regularly, only on a higher
military-technological level; where peasant's lands may be taken back
from them; where even serfdom, abolished by a reform in 1861, was
restored by a counter reform in 1929; and where all the amendments of
faulty government practices were perpetually erased by counter
amendments - to such an extent that new generations of reformers had to
[Vol. 18
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itself again, spelling the end of the period of liberalism begun under
Mikhail Gorbachev. Regardless of the exact scenario envisaged, these
various groups shared an underlying premise: Russia is not reformable. 14
Although predictions varied about how the reaction would come, there
was consensus as to why it would come. Generally, the pessimists believed
five socio-political factors existed that assured the triumph of the anti-
reformist powers.' 5 First, they believed that public opinion in Russia
generally favored an expansionist foreign policy and was especially inclined
to help Russians in the "near abroad."' 6 As a result, the pressures of elite
and public opinion would force leaders to undertake aggressive actions
abroad.' 7 Second, there was the perception, "that the Russian elite retains
a strong imperial mindset and, in particular, is determined to regain control
of the old Soviet Union.""8 Third, it was believed that Russian elite,
particularly in leadership, was obsessed with the loss of prestige caused by
the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the empire. 9 Like France
in the late 19th century or Weimar Germany, this revanchist attitude would
encourage an aggressive foreign policy. Fourth, skeptics believed that
Western, especially American, foreign policy coddled Russian leaders, and
thus, aggravated the situation.2" Finally, it was widely believed that the
Russian economy was faring poorly and that the lack of economic growth
would lead to disenchantment with the reform process. 2' These factors
start the same reforms from scratch decades or even centuries later, only
to have them erased by new generations of counter-reformers.
Id. See also Charles H. Fairbanks, The Nature of the Beast, NAT'L INTEREST, Spring 1993,
at 46, 47 (describing the Soviet system as "an internal combustion engine, with its
controlled explosions" which sets up huge stresses which, in turn unleash counter-stresses).
14. Aslund, supra note 3, at 24.
15. See Sestanovich, supra note 7, at 5.
16. Id. "Many influential persons in Russia want to regain not only the empire but the
status of superpower." Pipes, Is Russia Still An Enemy?, supra note 5, at 74.




21. Id. See also Avraham Shama, Inside Russia's True Economy, FOREIGN POLICY,
Summer 1996, at 111.
Western governments and international assistance organizations that
subscribe to this bleak picture believe that they must use their resources
to aver Russia's economic meltdown, because such a meltdown might
bring untoward sociopolitical changes and even resurrect the 'Evil
Empire.' This picture has the sharp resolution only ideology can produce.
And it is wrong.
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were believed to create a dynamic in Russian politics that would lead to
renewed authoritarian rule. For years these views, or variations upon them,
have been extremely influential in both foreign policy and international
business circles.22 As discussed below, however, the pessimist's case was
weakened somewhat in the mid-1990s.
23
Political events undermined the economic reforms of the early 1990's
and seemed to buttress the pessimists' case. The political situation was
fluid and increasingly violent. Between August 1991 and October 1993,
Russia experienced two coup attempts, the first by hard-line Communists
against President Mikhail Gorbachev, the second led by right-wing elements
of the Soviet Parliament against President Boris Yeltsin.24 In the elections
of December 12, 1993, to the Lower House of the Duma, neo-fascist
candidate Vladimir Zhirinovsky's Liberal-Democratic Party received
twenty-three percent of the vote, the single largest share of any party.25
Less than one year later, in November 1994, President Yeltsin took the first
steps towards the war in Chechnya, a bloody and pointless campaign that
would result in the deaths of over 80,000 Chechens and Russian soldiers.26
Simultaneously, despite economic shock therapy begun in January
1992, all economic indicators were bad: the currency was unstable, the
standard of living was rapidly deteriorating, and social conditions portended
an explosion. 27 Given all this, it was not surprising that most Western
observers predicted a "gathering storm" over Russia, one that would likely
result in authoritarian rule.
B. The Case for Optimism: July 1996 to August 1998
In the mid-1990s a case for optimism regarding Russia's prospects
began to be made. After President Yeltsin's defeat of Communist candidate
Gennady Zyuganov in the Russian Presidential elections of July 1996, a
Id. at 112.
22. RICHARDLAYARD& JOHN PARKER, THE COMING RUSSIAN BOOM 2 (1997). "In recent
years such pessimism has dominated Western comment on Russia and much of the comment
in Russia itself. Yet generally the gloomy forecasts have proved false. Instead there has
been progress on most fronts. . . ." Id.
23. See Sestanovich, supra note 7, at 5-8; Shama, supra note 21, at 111-13; LAYARD &
PARKER, supra note 22, at 3-5.
24. For a discussion of the events leading up to the October coup attempt see REMNICK,
supra note 2, at 37-83.
25. Id. at 89.
26. Id. at 261.
27. See Shama, supra note 21, at 111-12.
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new, more optimistic prognosis of Russia's political and economic future
began gradually, if quietly, to take shape.28 There were several reasons for
this.
1. The Political Front
First, political developments were hopeful. Russia's political
institutions had survived several storms without a reversion to authoritarian
rule. The appointments of reformers Boris Nemtsov and Anatoly Chubais
as First Deputy Prime Ministers underscored President Yeltsin's
commitment to reform, and began a (brief) round of economic
liberalization.2 9 Moreover, despite occasional backsliding by the executive,
Russia remained (and remains) a democracy. "[R]eform has made great
headway," one expert wrote. "For all the drama of the last few years,
Russia has actually proven surprisingly stable."3" Indeed, while many
waited for old Russia to reassert itself, other observers believed, "a new,
pluralistic Russia has already emerged." 3 One study noted:
Despite the turmoil, significant progress has already been
made toward the consolidation of a post-communist system
with distinct channels of power and authority and a means of
assuring checks and balances. New groups with their own
stakes in this system are becoming more powerful and would
resist any leader who might seek to impose radical change.
The clock cannot be turned back, because, quite simply, it is
broken beyond repair.32
In contrast to the earlier pessimism of most Western observers, some
foresaw a period of relative tranquillity. Rather than a revanchist Russia,
tormented with imperial ambitions, a sated player appeared to be emerging
on the European scene.
28. See The Battle of Russia's Capitalisms, ECONOMIST, August 9, 1997, at 14. "The
past few months have witnessed the most cheery signs yet, since the Soviet empire blew
apart six years ago, that Russia could become a normal country .... Id. See also Aslund,
supra note 3, at 24-26.
29. See also Aslund, supra note 3, at 24-26.
30. Id. at 24.
31. Angela Stent & Lilia Shevtsova, Russia's Election: No Turning Back, FoREIGN
POLICY, Summer 1996, at 92.
32. Id.
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2. The Economic Front
Economically, there was growing consensus that Russia had passed
through the worst of its transition, and was on the verge of a economic
"take off" similar to the period of dynamism which the economies of
Southeast Asia experienced in the 1980s. Many economic indicators
suggested this scenario was possible. Russia, the optimists pointed out,
has one of the world's premier educational systems, a well-educated
workforce, and a potential market of millions;33 Russia is the world's
leading producer of many natural resources, including natural gas and
nickel; Russia produces more oil, steel, platinum, diamonds, and other
minerals on a per capita basis than the United States.'
Other economic indicators were similarly promising.35 Inflation was
dramatically reduced from 2500 percent a year in 1992 to 130 percent in
1995.36 Prices were being set by a freely, if imperfectly functioning,
market. Expenditure on the military fell from approximately twenty-five
percent of GDP under the Soviet economy, to approximately three percent
in 1997. 37 Simultaneously, but little commented upon, was the fact that
privatization had proceeded faster in Russia (at the time) than any other
country in Eastern Europe.38 ("[Currently,] more than [seventy] percent of
[Russian] GDP is produced in the private sector. "9)
With these statistics in mind, the pendulum of educated opinion swung
from bleak pessimism to cautious optimism - and in many cases all the way
to outright bullishness. "Russia is likely to experience growth averaging
at least [four] percent a year for a decade or more," one study predicted.
"In living standards Russia by 2020 may well have outstripped countries
like Poland, Hungary, Brazil, and Mexico, with China far behind. "I One
investment guide recommended, "now is the most convenient time to
penetrate and get settled into the Russian market, while competitors are still
few and the market's chaotic state allows such high return on the risk. 41
33. See LAYARD & PARKER, supra note 22, at 124.
34. Id. at 124-25.
35. See Jonathan Thatcher, Reformist Russia Starts to Glitter for Investors, REUTERS,
March 10, 1997, available in LEXIS.
36. See LAYARD & PARKER, supra note 22, at 141.
37. See Aslund, supra note 3, at 24-25.
38. See LAYARD & PARKER, supra note 22, at 125.
39. Aslund, supra note 3, at 24.
40. LAYARD & PARKER, supra note 22, at 148.
41. TANKRED G. GOLENPOLSKY, ROBERT M. JOHNSTONE & VLADIMIR A. KASHIN, DOING
[Vol. 18
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Many believed Russia was on the verge of an economic chudo, or
"miracle."'42 "The social cost of the transition has been great, but the new
Russia has a market economy based on private property and an elected, if
imperfect, government, 43 wrote one observer.
C. The Reckoning - August 1998
Then came August 1998. On August 17, the Russian ruble was
devalued, eventually plummeting almost seventy percent. Simultaneously,
the government stopped payments on its short-term debt, unleashing a
currency and financial crisis that appeared (and may yet) result in the
collapse of social order and democracy in Russia.' A bank run developed
as worried citizens sought desperately to withdraw their savings. As a
result of the collapse of the ruble, virtually all of Russia's private banks,
which had borrowed heavily from the West, became financially insolvent.45
One source predicted that Russian banks owed a total of $30 billion to
foreign creditors, while Russian corporations owed an additional $25
billion. 6 Conglomerates such as Inkombank, SBS-Agro and Rossisky-
Kredit each owed millions; SBS-Agro's indebtedness alone was reported to
total over $1 billion.47 Western stock markets, fearing the Russian
turmoil's impact on German and other Western lenders with exposure to the
unfolding crisis, fell startlingly.
To make matters worse, the Russian government appeared to be totally
impotent to stop the growing panic. President Yeltsin appointed Victor
Chernomyrdin and later Yevgeny Primakov, both anti-reformist Soviet era
hangovers, to rescue the country.4 8 By late September 1998, inflation was
up sixty-seven percent from the previous month, and many predicted hyper-
inflation would set in by years' end. 49 The economy as a whole was
BUSINESS IN RUSSIA 53 (Linda Pinkham ed., 2d ed. 1996).
42. See DANIEL YERGIN & THANE GUSTAFSON, RUSSIA 2010 &WHAT IT MEANS FOR THE
WORLD 160-61 (1993).
43. Aslund, supra note 3, at 25.
44. See Patricia Kranz, 'The Oligarchs have overplayed their hand, 'Bus. WK., Sept. 21,
1998, at 48. See also Daniel Yergin and Thane Gustafson, Don't Write Off Russia - Yet,
FORTUNE, Sept. 28, 1998 at. 99.
45. See Kranz, supra note 44, at 48.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. See Russia. Steady as She Drifts, ECONOMIST, Sept. 26, 1998, at 52.
49. See Greg Myre, Russian Inflation up 67 Percent since August; expected to worsen,
19991
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predicted to contract by five to six percent in 1999, and appeared on the
brink of total collapse.5" Although there is (as yet) no social unrest or anti-
democracy movement, the worst fears of the pessimists appear to be coming
true.
D. Russian Commercial Crime
What caused the collapse? Explanations are uncertain, but one theme
predominates: the prevalence and danger of commercial crime." Harvard
economist Marshall Goldman estimated that eighty percent of businesses in
Russia are controlled by criminal syndicates.52 Even if this is over
estimated, and as one expert thinks "the [criminal] picture is improving,
contrary to most reporting,"53 the problem remains. Indeed, many see the
proliferation of commercial crime, and the criminalization of Russia's
political and social life, as the greatest threat to Russia's participation in the
global economy, and even to its long-term stability. Many analysts and
investors have concluded that Russia is a lawless market-place, and
therefore risk overrides all possible reward. As one business guide bluntly
noted: "To survive in Russia, any private businessperson either Russian or
foreign, must continuously break the law."54  The crimanalization of
Russia's commercial life explains in large part the country's recent
economic experience.
III. RUSSIAN BusINEss CRIME & WESTERN INVESTMENT
A. Western Investment
Simply put, investing in Russia, while potentially rewarding, has never
been for the faint hearted. Although the law governing legal entities has
developed considerably since 1991, the unenforceability of contracts,
inadequate law enforcement, inchoate mechanisms for conflict resolution,
and, most importantly, the criminalization of business, have scared all but
the bravest - or most reckless - Western investors. The prevalence of
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept. 24, 1998, available in LEXIS.
50. Id.
51. See generally STEPHEN HANDELMAN, COMRADE CRIMINAL (1995).
52. See Dmitry Radyshevsky, The New Klondike Myth is Dispelled, in DOING BUSINESS
IN RUSSIA 22 (Linda Pinkham, 2d ed., 1995).
53. Aslund, supra note 3, at 25.
54. GOLENPOLSKY, supra note 41, at 53.
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crime has predictably chilled the economy. As the American Chamber of
Commerce in Russia put it shortly after the contract killing of American
businessman Paul Tatum, "[o]ne can hardly expect an investment boom in
a country where commercial disputes are settled through force of arms and
investment risk includes the very life of the investor. "I'
Nevertheless, Western investment in Russia, until recently, has
continued apace. By 1993, there were 12,000 registered enterprises with
foreign involvement in Russia, with the United States registering the
greatest number of joint ventures. 6  Although the sum of foreign
investments and the number of enterprises with foreign participation has
grown, "this growth was accompanied by a decline in the amount of the
average foreign share in the charter capital of enterprises with foreign
participation from [seventy-five to eighty] percent in mid-1993 to [thirty-
five to thrity-six] percent in early 1994. "" Thus far, the great bulk of joint
ventures between Westerners and Russians involved Western investment in
the service sector,5" including the production of consumer goods and
services, such as clothing, fast-food, and furniture. 59 Of the 12,294 joint
ventures with Western partners registered as of January 1, 1994, production
of consumer goods accounted for 35.5 percent of all foreign investment.
60
Investment in basic industries - oil and gas, chemicals, metallurgy, timber,
and the like - accounted for 32.2 percent.6' Business services, such as
accounting, have (until very recently) also prospered, with all the "Big
Four" accounting firms providing local financial and consulting services.62
Investment banking had also begun to boom prior to 1998. By August
1997, the Moscow Times stock index was six times higher in dollar terms
than eighteen months earlier, with the total value of Russian shares over
$100 billion.63 Renaissance Capital, Creditanstalt of Austria, and Belgium's
Banque Bruxelles Lambert had already entered the market through
55. Michael Lelyveld, Russian Leadership Hangs in a Delicate Balance, J. CoM., Nov.
6, 1996, at 2A.
56. See GOLENPOLSKY, supra note 41, at 48.
57. Id. at 61.
58. Id. at 63.
59. See generally U.S. Dept. of Commerce, 1997 Russian Country Commercial Guide,
July 30, 1996 (visited Nov. 6, 1998) <http://www.itaiep.doc.gov/bisnis/country/
ruccg.html >.
60. See GOLENPOLSKY, supra note 41, at 63.
61. Id.
62. See LAYARD & PARKER, supra note 22, at 144.
63. See Russian Finance: Plenty to Go Round, supra note 1, at 62.
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acquisition, and Merrill Lynch and Goldman Sachs were expected to open
a Moscow office by the end of 1997.1
Overall, owing to the uncertainty of the business climate, the vast
number of joint ventures with foreign investors has typically involved minor
investments. Nonetheless, many major investors in a variety of fields,
including Siemens,65 Proctor & Gamble,' Credit Swiss First Boston Ltd.,67
G.E.,68 and Westinghouse,69 have taken the plunge. Until very recently,
many experts believed this wave of investment would be the first of several
waves that would result in Western investment patterns similar to those
found in Taiwan, South Korea, or China.7"
1. Foreign Direct Investment
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Russia has outpaced investment in
the other nations of the former Soviet Union (with the exception of the
Baltic countries).7" And yet, due to political instability, inflation, and other
problems associated with new markets, Western investment in Russia has
been less than in the Eastern European nations, and far less than in
emerging Asian markets.7  According to the U.S. Department of
Commerce, "total foreign direct investment in Russia [by 1997] amounted
to $10 per person, compared with $200 and $100 in neighboring Poland and
64. Id. at 62-63. "Creditanstalt of Austria formed a joint venture with Grant, a broker
... [while] Banque Bruxelles Lambert acquired an interest in United City Bank." Id.
65. Siemens has been a major investor in the Russian power sector. In October 1995,
"Siemens (Germany) won a DM 200 million contract to build a gas powered steam turbine
plant in the Siberian city of Omsk." Power & Energy: Russia, Bus. E. EUR., Oct. 9, 1995,
available in LEXIS. Siemens also acquired minority interests in two St. Petersburg
companies: a ten percent stake in Leningradsky Metallichesky Zavod/LMZ, a turbine
maker, as well as a twenty percent stake in Elektrosila, a generator producer. Id.
66. See GOLENPOLSKY, supra note 41, at 14. Proctor & Gamble owns a fourteen percent
stake in Novomoskovskbythim. Id.
67. Id. Credit Swiss First Boston Ltd. is the leading Western investor in the Russian
securities market. Id.
68. See Power & Energy: Russia, Bus. EAS. E., Feb. 20, 1995, available in LEXIS.
G.E. Power Systems, a division of G.E., acquired a seventy percent stake in a joint venture
with Kirovsky Zavod, a St. Petersburg based firm, to produce gas turbines. Id.
69. Id.
70. See generally LAYARD & PARKER, supra note 22.
71. See generally U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Business in the Newly Independent States





Lithuania [respectively]. "73 In 1995, half of FDI was concentrated in four
sectors: trade (17.1 percent), finance (14.3 percent), food (10.1 percent),
and fuel (9.3 percent).74 The power sector has seen high profile deals
involving, among others, El~ctricit6 de France75 and Asea Brown Boveri
(ABB). In March 1996, ABB, a $25 billion Swedish-Swiss conglomerate,
76
won two contracts worth approximately $100 million from Omskenergo, the
Omsk energy utility producer, to supply equipment to power the Omsk
HPP-3 power plant in Western Siberia.77 Following FDI in the fuel sector
were investments in the metalworking and machine building sector, the
forestry sector, and chemicals.7"
2. Amount of Foreign Direct Investment
Estimates of FDI in Russia vary widely, due to "company
confidentiality and the relative lack of definitive means of establishing
actual cash inflows."79 Nonetheless, until August 1998, FDI in Russia was
expanding rapidily. According to the Russian State Committee on Statistics
(GOSKOMSTAT), FDI in 1993 totaled $2.9 billion, with ninety percent of
the capital in direct investments.," Unofficial U.S. Department of
Commerce estimates were lower, but predicted FDI of $290 million in 1992
(with no corresponding portfolio investment), $1.36 billion in 1993 (with
a corresponding $300 million in portfolio investment), $1.3 billion in 1994
(with a corresponding $2.5 billion in portfolio investment), and $1.5 billion
73. Id.
74. Id. In the previous two years, the fuel industry held a much more dominant role in
the investment environment (accounting forty-four percent of total foreign investment in
1994). The ascendancy of investment in other industry areas can be interpreted as a positive
sign of an economy that is becoming more diversified, and less reliant on the extraction of
natural resources. Id.
75. See Power & Energy: Slovakia, Bus. E. EuR., Jan. 8, 1996. "Slovakia: Electricite
de France (France) has signed an agreement with Slovenske Elekrarne, the state-owned
utility company, to provide technical and support services to complete the first two units at
the embattled Mochovce nuclear power plant." Id. See Power & Energy: Lithuania, Bus.
E. EUR., Jan. 29, 1996 (discussing an agreement between Electricite de France and
Lithuania to conduct a feasibility study to sell electricity to Western Europe).
76. See generally ROSABETH Moss KANTER, WORLD CLASS: THRIVING LOCALLY IN THE
GLOBAL ECONOMY 47-48 (1997).
77. See Ian Rodger, ABB Wins Russian Power Deal, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 14, 1996, at 3,
available in LEXIS.
78. See BISNIS, supra note 71.
79. Id.
80. See GOLENPOLSKY, supra note 41, at 59-60.
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in both FDI and portfolio investment in 1995.81 By 1996, GOSKOMSTAT
estimated the total volume of accumulated foreign direct investment in the
Russian Federation at just over $7 billion.82 Looking at the Commonwealth
of Independent States (CIS) as a whole, the total was between $10 and $11
billion.83
Investors have been primarily Western, and of those, predominantly
European. The five leading sources of investment in Russia, as of July 1,
1993, were the aggregate East European nations (14.5 percent), the United
States (10.6 percent), Finland (9 percent), Germany (8.3 percent), and Italy
(7.8 percent).' The largest single investor, in cumulative dollars, has been
the United States.85 The Russian Ministry of the Economy estimated in
March 1996 that in 1995 the U.S. accounted for 29.1 percent of new total
investment ($812.9 million), Switzerland 15 percent ($419.8 million), and
finally Germany 10.5 percent ($293 million).86
B. Governing Law Regarding Western Investment In Russia
Structuring investments in Russia is still complex and unsettled.
Corporate law regulating Western investment is found in several different
instruments. The most recent instrument is the Russian Civil Code. Part
One of the Civil Code was adopted by the Russian State Duma on October
1994.87 Part Two was adopted in December 199588 and signed by President
Yeltsin on January 26, 1996. Prior to adoption of the entire Civil Code on
January 1, 1995, the creation, function, and dissolution of corporate entities
in Russia was governed by three separate pieces of legislation: the Law on
Enterprises,89 the Law on Joint Stock Companies, put into force by the
81. See BISNIS, supra note 71.
82. See GOLENPOLSKY, supra note 41, at 60.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. See BISNIS, supra note 71.
86. Id.
87. Federal Law on the Introduction Into Operation of Part One of the Civil Code of the
Russian Federation, Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1994, No.32 [weekly] Art. No. 3302, reprinted
and translated in WILLIAM E. BUTLER, CIVIL CODE OF THE RusSIAN FEDERATION 504
(1997).
88. Federal Law on the Introduction Into Operation of Part Two of the Civil Code of the
Russian Federation, Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1996, No. 5 [weekly], Art. No. 411, reprinted
and translated in BUTLER, supra note 87, at 509.
89. See RSFSR: Law on Enterprises and Entrepreneurship, enacted in Dec. 25, 1990,
reprinted in ECONOMIC LAW OF RussIA, available in LEXIS.
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RSFSR Council of Ministers Decree 601, 90 and the Foreign Investment
Law. 91 The Civil Code does not supplant these earlier instruments, though
it does seek to clarify their provisions. 92 If conflict arises between the Civil
Code and previously existing legislation, the Civil Code will prevail. 93 In
addition, both the Federal Assembly and the President may issue legal
decrees under the Constitution, which may impact business. 9' Overall,
experts believe that Russian corporate law has largely stabilized, and
barring radical political change, will continue to do so. 95
C. Structuring Investments in Russia
Generally, FDI in Russia is structured in one of three ways under
existing Russian corporate law.
1. Portfolio Investment
First, foreign investors may purchase enterprises outright through
state-sponsored privatization.96 Investors may participate as primary or
secondary purchasers of securities, thus obtaining equity interests.
97
Foreign portfolio investment is increasingly used by individuals and
corporations for short-term returns. 98 "Portfolio investment equities are
traded on several markets, with foreigners owning as much as [forty]
percent of Russian companies' publicly-traded equities. "9 In certain
sensitive sectors, such as oil or gas, mandatory investigations of foreign
investors are required, while in other areas, investment may be denied
altogether.
90. See Jonathan Russin, Aleksander Podoisky & John Knab, Forming a Russian
Company, March 1, 1996 (visited Oct. 27, 1998) <http://www.itaiep.doc.gov/bisnis/
country/russin.html >.
91. See RFSFR: Law on Foreign Investments, enacted on July 4, 1991, reprinted in 31
I.L.M. 397 (1992).
92. See GOLENPOLSKY, supra note 41, at 98.
93. See Russin, supra note 90.
94. See GOLENPOLSKY, supra note 41, at 96.
95. Id at 98.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. BISNIS, supra note 71.
99. Id.
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The 1997 surge in the Russian stock market enticed several large
institutional investors into the Russian market.'o Renaissance Capital
announced plans in July 1997, to merge with MFK, the investment banking
arm of a diversified Russian conglomerate whose leader is Uneximbank,
Russia's largest private bank.'"' The merged bank will be called
MFK-Renaissance, and will have equity of $200 million and gross assets of
$2 billion. ' 2 Given the recent troubles, however, banking initiatives are
suspended, and share prices have plummeted.
2. Representative Offices
A second vehicle for investment is for a Western investor to open an
independent, representative office of a foreign corporation. Article 55 of
the Civil Code provides (vaguely) that corporations may establish
"representations and branches." 03  The representative office is an
"individual subdivision" of an existing corporation and may be used as a
point of contact, or liaison office between the foreign investor and a
Russian enterprise." ° A representative office may be either accredited or
unaccredited. 10 "An accredited office can market and sign contracts, but
cannot engage in taxable commercial activities. "106 A non-accredited office
is in most respects identical to the accredited office, except that it may not
issue invitations to foreigners to visit the office, which is necessary to
receive visas. 1o Representative offices allow a business to keep its options
open and establish contacts before committing FDI. 08
100. See Russian Finance: Plenty to Go Round, supra note 1, at 62-63.
101. Id. at 63.
102. Id.
103. Civil Code of the Russian Federation (Part I), art. 55, Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1994,
No. 32 [weekly] Art. No. 3301, reprinted and translated in BUTLER, supra note 87, at 29.
104. See PRICE WATERHOUSE, DOING BUSINESS IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, Jan. 1,
1994, at 59.
105. See U.S. Embassy, Moscow, Working With Russian Business Partners (Feb. 7,
1996) (visited Oct. 27, 1998) <http://www.itaiep.doc.gov/bisnis/country/rupartnr.html>.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. See GOLENPOLSKY, supra note 41, at 100.
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3. Registered Joint Ventures
A third way of investing, and the most common, is through a joint
venture. Generally, a joint venture is similar to a partnership, and may be
structured in a variety of ways. 109 Western firms may incorporate a new
entity under Russian law or invest in an existing Russian entity. In the
Russian context, it is common for the Western investor to provide the
necessary capital, while the Russian partner may provide a low-cost,
under-used manufacturing facility, or, in the case of marketing Western
goods, local knowledge and access to a wide market." 0 Many Western
corporations, including Mars, Pepsi, Coca-Cola, Caterpillar, and
Deutschetelekom have invested in Russia through joint ventures."' As
experts point out, "[m]ost Western companies that have started up in Russia
have as their prime objective supplying the potentially huge domestic
market, and they want to do so from inside Russia, because costs are low
(wages around $100 a month) and most imports are taxed."
1 12
4. Legal entities for joint ventures.
The Russian Civil Code provides for four legal entities. Investors can
establish or invest in general partnerships (tovarishchestvo na vere), limited
partnerships, (kommanditnoe tovarishchestvo) and limited responsibility
societies" 3 (similar to American LLCs, or German GmbHs). 4 However,
the most common form, and thus the most appealing to any Western
investor looking to register an enterprise in Russia, is the non-publicly
traded or "closed" Joint Stock corporations. This is often structured by
way of a joint venture between a Western investor and an existing Russian
organization. "15
The closed Joint Stock Company ("JSC") is similar to a Western
corporation. It may issue shares, limit liability for shareholders, and the
109. See RALPH H. FOLSOM & MICHAEL W. GORDON, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
TRANSACTIONS 541-42 (1995).
110. See LAYARD & PARKER, supra note 22, at 144.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. See GOLENPOLSKY, supra note 41, at 101.
114. See OECD, INVESTMENT GUIDE FOR THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION 89 (1996)
[hereinafter "OECD GUIDE"].
115. See PRICE WATERHOUSE, supra note 104, at 62.
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like."I6 A closed JSC has a limited number of shareholders and restricts
registration and transferability of shares in accordance with the articles of
incorporation. " 7 The Law on Foreign Investment, as well as Article 98 of
Part One of the Civil Code (with parallel provisions) delineates the
procedure for forming a closed JSC. " Registration with State Agencies, "9
capitalization rules, 2 ' and disclosure requirements must be met as well.'
Specific registration requirements exist for joint ventures involving
foreigners. 122
IV. RUSSIAN BUSINESS CRIME
A. The Post-Soviet Russian Economy
Even before the current economic crisis, Russia was generally
regarded as the "Wild West" of the modern global economy. Economic
liberalization made a few extraordinarily wealthy, while others, especially
the elderly and those on fixed incomes, have seen their savings evaporate
and their standard of living fall precipitously under the free-market reforms
116. Civil Code of the Russian Federation (Part I), art. 96 § 1, reprinted and translated
in BUTLER, supra note 87, at 55. "Participants in the joint-stock company (shareholders)
shall not be liable for its obligations and bear the risk of losses connected with the activity
of the society within the limits of the value of the stocks belonging to them." Id.
117. See OECD GUIDE, supra note 115, at 90.
118. Civil Code of the Russian Federation (Part I), art. 98, reprinted and translated in
BUTLER, supra note 87, at 56. See PRICE WATERHOUSE, supra note 104, at 63-64
(describing the various and complex steps necessary to forming a JSC).
119. See generally PRICE WATERHOUSE, supra note 104, at 60-63.
120. Id. at 63. As of 1994, minimum capitalization for a closed JSC was 10,000 rubles
and 100,000 rubles for an open JSC. Id.
121. Id. at 63-64. JSCs are required to make available for inspection accounts, reports,
and other information contained in the founding documents, and other accounting
requirements may be required in addition by the Ministry of Finance. Id.
122. See Working With Russian Business Partners, supra note 105. Closed JSCs are not
only the easiest for foreign investors to employ, should they choose the registered enterprise
as their vehicle for penetrating the Russian market, but they are also the legal entity most
misused for commercial crime. Of commercial crimes committed in the private sector in
1995, the majority were perpetrated in or with JSCs. See Larisa Kislinskaya, Z000
Economic Crimes Committed in Moscow in 1995, ITAR-TASS, Jan. 24, 1996, available in
LEXIS. "The Department of Economic Crimes has prepared law suits against almost 8,000
people" in 1995. Id. Roughly 17 percent of these crimes were committed in the banking
and financial sphere, and 3.5 percent were committed involving foreign investment
activities. Id.
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spearheaded by Yegor Gaidar in 1991.123 The collapse of Soviet central
planning brought prosperity, destitution, and uncertainty. State institutions,
such as schools and hospitals, experienced a loss of subsidies and found
state infrastructure and services in dramatic decline. 124 The drop in life
expectancies, especially for men, dramatically represents the frightening
disintegration of post-Soviet Russia's economic and social life. In 1987,
life expectancy peaked for Russian men at sixty-five years. By 1993, it had
fallen to fifty-nine years.' 25
However, the widespread growth of crime is the most noticeable
change in Russia and has had the most profound social and economic
consequences. There were many reasons for this. The fledgling Russian
Republic lacked a body of commercial law regulating economic crimes,
civil institutions laying out fiduciary responsibilities and expectations -
indeed, even the tradition of a Rechtstaat, in which rules, and not powerful
individuals or institutions, were paramount. As one expert put it, "[i]n
contemporary Russia as well as in medieval Europe personal relationships
are often more important than relations based on formal roles in political,
social, or economic structures. This means that the most powerful people
in the country are not elected officials, but the close friends of the
president."1"6 As a result, krysha, a "private roof of protection," has
become a key element of business relations.2 7 Additionally, the lack of a
tradition of private property rights and a civic culture contribute to the
pervasiveness of corruption. As one expert pointed out, politicians and
government employees, "entertain close relationships with the companies
whose stock they own." 28 Western business ethics simply do not exist.
In this milieu, crime exploded, with profound social and economic
consequences. Consequently, many began to associate lawlessness with
post-Communist liberalization and democracy in general. The Russian
word for privatization (privitizatsia) was replaced in common parlance by
prikhvatizatsia, or "grabitization." 29 As the Chairman of the U.S. House
International Relations Committee put it,
123. See REMNICK, supra note 2, at 46.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Vladimir Shlapentokh, Russia: Privatization and Illegalization of Social and
Political Life, WASH. Q. Winter 1996, at 66.
127. Id. at 65.
128. Id. at 72.
129. See Jean MacKenzie, Eastern Pride and Western Prejudice, THE Moscow TIMES,
Feb. 13, 1999, available in LEXIS.
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Russian organized crime groups have flourished like mold in
a petri dish in this new and open economic environment.
The evidence suggests that they buy parliaments, manipulate
markets and currencies and engage in money laundering and
cyber-crime. They are also trafficking in narcotics, as well
as the illicit sale of arms, including possible weapons and
technology of mass destruction. 30
B. The Soviet Economic System & Corruption
In many respects, the corrupt habits and institutions of the past Soviet
system produce present day commercial crimes. Particularly, the Soviet
socialist economic system is to blame. The system sustained and nurtured
the necessary pre-conditions for the lawlessness of the current post-Soviet
landscape.
1. "Irrational" Decision Making
In market economies, "rational" principles of supply and demand, not
irrational preferences, govern micro and macro economic decision making.
Generally, inefficiency is weeded out through competition. Badly run,
unprofitable, or inefficient firms fail. Corruption, even in relatively
transparent economies, such as the United States, is an attempt to evade this
outcome. It is an attempt to achieve through illicit payments or similar
favors results that could not be obtained through the neutral decision
making of the market.
In nonmarket economies, some other mechanism must exist to allocate
resources, set prices, and otherwise make the distributional decisions
typically solved through the interaction of supply and demand. In the
Soviet system, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union ("CPSU") made
all such decisions by administrative fiat, within the parameters of the annual
state budget. ' 3' The CPSU, "determin[ed] the allocation of total output by
end use among private consumption, investment, public consumption,
defense, and administration."13 2 Instead of the neutral mechanism of the
130. Webwire-Threat From Russian Organized Crime: Hearings on Russian Organized
Crime, Before House International Relations Committee, 104"' Cong. (Remarks of Benjamin
A. Gilman, Chairman of House International Relations Committee) available in
WESTLAW.
131. See PAUL R. GREGORY & ROBERT STUART, SOVIET ECONOMIC STRUCTURE AND
PERFORMANCE 191 (4th ed. 1990).
132. Id. See also RICHARD PIPES, SURVIVAL Is NOT ENOUGH 116, 117 (1984). [T]he
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market, decisions were made by personal preference, political need - and
corrupt practices. These "irrational" incentives were prime movers in the
Soviet economy. 133 Among other side effects, this economic system created
and sustained a high level of corruption. Inefficiency led to corruption, and
corruption caused more inefficiency, creating a vicious and seemingly
unbreakable cycle.
2. "Soft-budget" Constraints in Socialist Economies
The prevalence of corruption as a principal economic incentive was
only possible due to a distinguishing feature of the socialist economic
model: money as a "soft budget" constraint. The classic explanation for
this dynamic was formulated by Hungarian economist Janos Kornai.
Kornai differentiated between resource, demand, and budget constraints in
socialist economies.' 34 A budget constraint; that is, the ability of a firm to
cover its expenditures from its own proceeds, can be either "hard" or
"soft."' 35 In free market economies, budget constraints are typically
"hard"; in other words, the inability of a firm to make a profit or sell its
product results in economic loss. If a firm in a market economy sells fewer
products, it will produce fewer of them. If a firm cannot sell any products,
it will go bankrupt.
Conversely, in socialist economies such as the Soviet Union, money
was a "soft budget" constraint.' 36 The inability of a firm to sell its product
was only marginally relevant to its status as a going concern. Put in
economic terms, "there [was] little or no connection between monetary and
real phenomena [in the Soviet economy]; money [was] neutral in terms of
system is so absurdly designed that those responsible for production may be said to have a
vested interest in preventing it from improving. Instead of allowing costs and profits to
determine what is produced an in what quantities, the government sets arbitrary production
quotas for each branch of the economy.
Id. at 116.
133. See ED A. HEwITr, REFORMING THE SOVIET ECONOMY: EQUALITY VERSUS
EFFICIENCY 196-98 (1988).
134. Janos Kornai, Soft Budget Constraints, in FROM STALINISM TO PLURALISM 184 (Gale
Stokes ed., 1991).
135. Id. at 185.
136. Id. at 186. It was this difference, according to Kornai, that principally differentiated
socialist and capitalist economies. "With the classical capitalist firm it is usually the
demand constraint that is binding, while with the traditional socialist firm it is the resource
constraint." Id.
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economic activity.' 1 37 In such a system, "financial outcomes, such as
profits or credits, [do] not affect real economic variables, such as output,
employment." 138  The result, Kornai pointed out, was that if a firm
continued to lose money, it would not necessarily go bankrupt. 3 9 Instead,
the state would come to its aid through various means: o the firm would
receive additional credit, its taxes would be reduced, it would be granted a
subsidy, or its selling price would be raised. '41 Whatever the means, the
firm would survive financial difficulties. 142 In such a soft-budget system,
what in a normal economic system would have been a bankrupt firm might
still continue for years, or even decades, as a going concern. As a result,
enterprises became dependent upon government officials for patronage.
Firms would receive state support not because of efficiency, but because of
connections. The soft-budget model was inherently undisciplined, and
because it relied on patronage and connections to function, it made
corruption inevitable and far-reaching.
3. The Role of Corruption in Socialist Economies
The combination of a secretive, closed political system, a lack of
budgetary constraints, and the monopolization of power by the CPSU
created a climate conducive to widespread corruption. First, the absurd
over centralization of the Soviet system ensured a "black market" or
"second economy." 143 This second economy, "encompass[ed] the barter of
goods and services; moonlighting by state employees; the use of
government equipment and material for personal profit; construction work;
and, above all, the production and marketing of food."'" Bribery, police
protection, and kickbacks were fundamental byproducts of this private
economy. "The entire Soviet system - everything, without exception -
was nothing more than an enormous black market," one Soviet dissident
137. GREGORY & STUART, supra note 132, at 190.
138. Id.
139. Kornai, supra note 135, at 186.
140. Id.
141. Id. "Accordingly [a firm's] demand is hardly constrained by solvency
considerations." Id.
142. Id.
143. PIPES, supra note 133, at 142-43.
144. Id. at 143.
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wrote.'45 Although the formal structures of the Soviet state collapsed in
1991, the informal practices, mores, and relationships live on.
Secondly, the centralization of all national power and money in the
hands of the CPSU fostered corruption amidst the ruling elite. As one
observer noted: "Communist regimes represent an instance of public
authority that owns all the nation's wealth and invades every sphere of its
life. And since they provide no external checks on those who wield this
authority, they inexorably become corrupted from top to bottom. "46
By the 1970s, criminal syndicates known as vory v zakone (or "thieves
in law") were either aligned with or indistinguishable from the authorities
and engaged in a multitude of criminal activities. 4 7  The principal
beneficiaries of the Soviet economy had become the members of the
nomenclatura, not society at large. 48  "The nomenklatura's principal
attributes - a paramilitary hierarchy, hostility towards outsiders, and a
propensity for illegal behavior - established its similarity with the criminal
societies of the old Russian underworld." 49 By the Brezhnev era, the
nomenklatura had deteriorated from the small, ideologically motivated elite
of revolutionary times to a large parasitic class, in many respects
indistinguishable from a criminal syndicate. Bribery, extortion, and even
murder were not an ugly side-effect of power (as they are, to some extent,
in all economies) but the principal reasons for obtaining power, and the
chief instruments of maintaining it. As one observer noted at the time:
"[Iln the Soviet Union any post, whether in the Party, the state or the
economic apparatus, entitles the incumbent to extort money and services
from those who depend on his good will ... [Indeed, for many officials,
the reason for aspiring to office is to be able to engage in extortion." 150
The situation had so deteriorated that, just prior to the collapse of
Communism, one observer pointed out, "[t]he system virtually compels
honest people to turn criminal and thus to live under permanent threat of
exposure and punishment. "'5'
145. HANDLEMAN, supra note 51, at 64.
146. PIPES, supra note 132, at 153.
147. Russia's Mafia: More Crime Than Punishment, ECONOMIST, July 9, 1994, at 19. It
is estimated that currently 289 vory v zakone operate in Russia, distributing favors, and
dividing up territories and distribution networks. Id. See generally HANDELMAN, supra
note 51, at 28-43.
148. PIPES, supra note 132, at 29.
149. HANDLEMAN, supra note 51, at 99.
150. PIPES, supra note 132, at 153.
151. Id. at 157.
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C. The Emergence of Business Crime In Post-Soviet Russia
While it was known that corruption thrived in the Soviet bloc, it took
the end of the Cold War to really expose the depths to which it had become
entrenched. Prior to the end of the Cold War, the costs of this massively
corrupt economic order could be hidden behind an iron curtain of
nationalized industries and bureaucratic regulations. Sprawling government
bodies encouraged a black market of favors, the costs of which could easily
be hidden by falsifying business records. Without the discipline of a
bottom line, inefficient and corrupt enterprises could stagger along for
decades. The corruption in the Soviet Union was so well disguised that few
Western observers comprehended extent of the disintegration. Between
1928 and 1955, for example, Soviet GNP was estimated at increasing 4.4
percent to 6.3 percent per annum.5 2 Even by the mid-1980s, the CIA
estimated Soviet growth at a healthy 2 to 2.3 percent growth per annum. 1
53
We now know the growth rate was closer to zero, and may have even been
negative. The gears of the system had simply frozen up, but few outsiders
could see it.
The end of the Soviet Union exposed this breakdown to world
scrutiny. "Post-Soviet market reforms kicked over a rotting log, disclosing
and also liberating the corruption and mayhem of the underground."'4 In
the chaotic atmosphere accompaning the collapse of the old order, it was
perhaps inevitable that the widespread criminal activity would overtly
thrive. Whether inevitable or not, two factors were especially critical in
allowing commercial crime to flourish as it has. First was the collapse of
the centralized command-and-control economic model. The result has been
that while the soft budget constraints of the old system continue to erode,
the hard budget constraints of a truly free economy are not yet in place.
The result is a sort of corrupt version of capitalism, operating largely
outside the framework of law. 1
55
152. FRANcIs FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN 28 (1992).
153. Id. Even as late as 1984 John Kenneth Galbraith, an economist at Harvard
University opined, "[the] Soviet system has made great economic progress in recent years
.... One can see it in the appearance of solid well-being of the people in the streets."
Quoted in Robert Conquest, Academe & the Soviet Myth, NAT'L. INTEREST, Spring 1993,
at 91, 96.
154. Robert S. Leiken, Controlling the Global Corruption Epidemic, FOREIGN POLICY,
Dec. 1996, at 55, 62.
155. See REMNICK, supra note 2, at 108.
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Second, the breakdown of law and order permitted crime to flourish.
As yet, there is little effective law enforcement in Russia. Nor is there an
effective judiciary. Worse, both the law enforcement and the judiciary are
thoroughly corrupt. 56 Personal protection and dispute resolution is largely
a personal matter outside the regulation or competence of the state. "People
look for protection by offering rewards on a private basis - either by
making special arrangements with state agencies, powerful local bosses, or
criminal organizations, or by creating private armies." 57 The result is what
some regard as a "feudalization" of contemporary life, in which violence
is rampant, state agencies are ineffective, personal relationships matter
more than formal roles or legal structures, and no distinction exists between
the public and private spheres of life.'
D. Russian Business Crime
An understanding of this background is essential to Westerners
engaged in business in Russia. Westerners need to be prepared for these
realities, as well as the types of crime they are likely to encounter while
doing business in Russia.
1. Extortion
The most threatening commercial crime affecting foreigners
conducting business in Russia is extortion. Typically, extortion demands
begin with mafia figures approaching Western investors for protection
money.159 If the Westerner agrees, demands then escalate from simply
protection money to giving jobs to criminals. "6 In the worse situations, the
criminals eventually take over the entire business. 16' According to the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce, of 199 businesses operating in Russia, 19 were
approached for protection money. 162  The numbers, however, may
understate the degree to which criminal activity permeates business life.
"[M]ost active people in the country are linked directly or indirectly with
corrupt officials, with a criminal organization, or with both. Business in
156. See infra notes 235-46 and accompanying text.
157. Shlapentokh, supra note 127, at 67.
158. Id.
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the country is impossible without the support of a corrupt bureaucracy and
criminal organizations." 163 Even where businesses avoid outright extortion,
the indirect need for krysha of some sort is paramount. 164
2. Bribery
Bribery has a venerable history in Russia. The Czarist empire was
well known for its lethargic and corrupt bureaucrats, foreshadowing their
Soviet (and now, again, Russian) successors by several centuries. Under
the Czarist empire, once taxes and other dues were given over to the state,
officials were allowed to keep whatever excess they could squeeze out of
the population, a process known as kormleniia ("feedings"). 165 The
institution of bribery was so prevalent that by the late seventeenth century,
Moscow officials set formal tariffs on the loot that officials could carry over
with them into retirement, with the government taking the remainder. "
"Even in the Imperial period, . . . bribery was universal."167 During the
Golden Age of Nineteenth century Russian literature, the bribe-taking
government official was a common character.168 In 1836, Nikolai Gogol
lampooned the corruption of Imperial Russia in The Government Inspector,
in which the town judge laments, "I freely admit I take bribes, but what
kind of bribes? Borzoi puppies, that's all!'
'1 69
In contemporary Russia, bribery is by far the most prevalent
commercial crime, and at the same time, the least punished. 70 In 1995, the
Russian police reported 5,000 cases of bribery. 17' In 1995, for example, of
15,000 plus charges filed for abuse of office, 5,000 were bribery counts. 1
72
According to police officials charged with investigating and prosecuting
163. Shlapentokh, supra note 127, at 75.
164. Id. at 65.
165. PIPES, supra note 132, at 152.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. See, e.g., GOGOL, supra note **, at 26. In the play, a case of mistaken identity
results in the mayor, the town judge and other major figures of a small village heaping
massive bribes on an itinerant stranger in the erroneous belief that he is a government agent
from St. Petersburg. See generally, GOGOL, supra note **
169. Id. at 26.





commercial bribery, the amount of bribery discovered by officials is as low
as one percent of the amount of bribery that actually occurs. '
73
3. Money Laundering
The objective of money laundering is to disguise the origins of
criminals' cash by "laundering" it through apparently legitimate business
concerns. 174  Laundering dirty money from the multitude of criminal
activities in which the Russian mafia is engaged has become an extensive
operation, involving collaboration with other criminal syndicates across
Europe. 175 As a result, criminal penetration of the Russian banking system
has become extensive. Some estimate that as many as eighty percent of
Russia's banks may be under the control of the Russian mob, 176 while other
European criminal syndicates funnel money into Russian banks under the
guise of commercial deals or consulting contracts. 177 Once the money is
"cleaned," it is then transferred back into European bank accounts. 78 The
scope of the problem is such that some international agencies, such as the
International Monetary Fund ("IMF"), and concerned nations, have begun
to take action. In February 1997, Antigua closed down five out of six




With the spread of crime has come the spread of violence. "That
Russian bankers are murdered in a gangland style on am [sic] almost weekly
basis is part of the hard-edged reality of commercial life here," the U.S.
Embassy in Moscow reported. 8 ' In the first five months of 1994, 664
crimes were committed with firearms or explosives in Moscow, and 188
173. Id.
174. See That Infernal Washing Machine, ECONOMIST, July 26, 1997, at 19.
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180. U.S. Embassy in Moscow, Russia, Russia's Emerging Commercial Class, (visited
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cases of hostage-taking were reported.' 8' In 1995, there were 29,000
murders, of which two-thirds went unsolved. 82 Russian Interior Minister
Anatoly Kulikov estimated that there were 560 contract killings in 1995,
and 450 in the first ten months of 1996.183
Many murder victims have been extremely prominent people. In April
1994, Andrei Azderdzis, a Member of Parliament, was shot dead, allegedly
because he owned a newspaper that had published a list of the top thieves
in Russia. " The following year, Vladislav Listyev, a popular television
journalist, was murdered. Listyev was slated to take over as head of
Russian Public Television at Ostankino and was probably killed because the
mafia feared that reorganizing advertising sales and other business practices
would hurt their business.'85 Shortly thereafter in November 1996, Paul
Tatum, an American partner in the Radisson-Slavyanskaya Hotel, fell
victim to a gangland style killing. '86 This was the first incident of mob
violence against a Western businessman and received major media attention.
The largest and most prominent murder in post-Soviet Russia occurred
on November 20, 1998 when Galina Starovoitova, an outspoken member
of the Russian Duma, an associate of the late Nobel Laureate Andrei
Sakharov (considered by many to be the conscience of post-Communist
Russia), and an international campaigner for human rights, was gunned
down in her apartment building in St. Petersburg. 87 Ms. Starovoitova was
regarded as a liberal pro-Western voice in Russian politics, as well as a
vocal campaigner against corruption.188 Her killing, occurring during the
ongoing melt-down of the Russian economy, symbolized the fears of many
that corruption was slowly strangling Russian's nascent democracy. 1
89
181. See Russia's Mafia, supra note 147, at 19.
182. See Russia. Money Kills, ECONOMIST, Nov. 16, 1996, at 51.
183. Id.
184. See Russia's Mafia, supra note 147, at 19.
185. See Crime in the New Independent States: the U.S. Response, U.S. DEPT. OF ST.
DISPATCH (U.S. Dept. of St., Washington, D.C.), Apr. 3, 1995, at 680. After the Listyev
murder, the U.S. State Department noted, "[t]he murder represents a great tragedy for
Russia and for democracy; it also illustrates the viciousness of the new criminal breed in
Russia." Id.
186. Lelyveld, supra note 55, at 2A.
187. Marcus Warren,International: Russia Mourns its Leading Lady, DAILY TELEGRAPH,
Nov. 23, 1998, at 11; Elizabeth Williamson, Thousands Mourn Russian Lawmaker,
CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Nov. 25, 1998, at 3.
188. Williamson, supra note 187, at 3.
189. Warren, supra note 187, at 11.
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E. Effects of Russian Commercial Crime
1. Economic Effects on the Russian Economy.
The economic consequences of corruption have been extensively
documented. 11 Generally, corruption misallocates resources, drains
national treasuries of tax revenue, and allows incompetent and inefficient
industries to escape the chastening rigors of the free market. 19' Russia is no
exception to the hardships and inefficiencies caused by the prevalence of
commercial crime.
a. Corruption as a Hidden Business Tax
Commercial crime in Russia acts as a hidden tax on businesses,
discouraging investment, and further burdening honest enterprises.92 The
expenses are numerous. Yeltsin officials estimate that seventy to eighty
percent of private businesses pay extortion fees in order to acquire
krysha. 193 In order to move around Moscow, one might endure costs of $10
to $20 a day to bribe corrupt police officers. 19 A visit to a nuclear complex
runs around $3,000, while interviews with government officials - which
are necessities to any Western investor seeking to do business in Russia -
190. See, e.g., Paulo Mauro, Corruption and Growth, Q. J. OF ECONOMICS, Aug. 1995,
at 680. See also Michael A. Almond & Scott D. Syfert, Beyond Compliance: Corruption,
Corporate Responsibility, & Ethical Standards in the New Global Economy, 22 N.C. J.
INT'L L. & COM. REG. 389 (1997). "Corruption distorts markets because it sets prices not
through supply and demand, but through self-serving, inefficient preferences. The efficient
enterprise is often punished; the corrupt enterprise prospers." Id. at 434. See also Leiken,
supra note 158, at 55, 64-65; Gregory Miles, Crime, Corruption, and Multinational
Business, INT'L Bus., July 1995, at 34.
191. See generally Daniel Kaufmann, Corruption: The Facts, FOREIGN POLICY, Summer
1997, at 114.
192. Id. at 119-20. "[llnvesting in a relatively corrupt country, as compared with an
uncorrupt one, is equivalent to an additional 20 percent ('private') tax on the investment.
The statistical relationship between corruption and lower foreign investment is valid across
all regions." Id. at 120. Economists point out that corruption is even more punitive and
distortionary than taxation. Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Corruption, Q. J. OF
ECON., Aug. 1993, at 599-600.
193. Webwire-Threat From Russian Organized Crime: Hearings on Russian Organized
Crime, Before House International Relations Committee, 1041 Cong. (Remarks of John
Deutch, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency) available in WESTLAW [hereinafter
"John Deutch"]
194. See Bribes in Russia: Just Say No?, RuSSIA & COMMONWEALTH Bus. L. REP., Sept.
15, 1995.
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run from $200 to well over $1,000, depending upon the officials' ranks. 95
In a 1995 report on barriers to trade and investment the American Chamber
of Commerce in Russia exclaimed, "[w]hat used to be a reasonable and
codified system of payments has now lost all sense of reality." 196 The
spread of corruption and organized crime in the former Soviet Union has
been a boom to one sector however - Western security agencies. A
security service in Moscow costs between $2,500 and $5,000 per month per
full-time guard. 97
b. Corruption as a Non-monetary Disincentive
Doing business in a corrupt society not only costs money but more
importantly, time. One economist found a positive relationship between the
prevalence of bribery and the amount of time a manager must spend with
public officials.1 98 Entrepreneurs who must elicit official permission for
numerous business activities spend excessive amounts of time soliciting
advice from government officials. High bribe-paying firms are forced to
spend seventy-five staff weeks per year of (nonowner) administration time
to deal with government officials, compared with a yearly average of only
twenty-two staff weeks for firms that do not engage in extensive illicit
payments. 199 Overall, it is estimated that managers in Russia spend between
thirty to forty percent of their time dealing with government officials, rather
than running their enterprise. 2°
c. Corruption and Capital Flight
Corruption also has a less obvious effect on nations: capital flight.
Crime exacerbates social unrest, as well as political uncertainty, which
causes investors to shelter their wealth abroad. This investment risk,
coupled with large domestic savings rates, produces capital flight. 20' This
dynamic has been observed in both China20 2 and Russia.2 03 As a result,
195. Miles, supra note 190, at 28.
196. Russia: Crime Counts, Bus. E. EUR., July 10, 1995, at 5.
197. Id.
198. See Kaufmann, supra note 191, at 119.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 121. By contrast, managers in Chile, El Salvador, and Uruguay spend eight
to twelve percent of their time, while in Lithuania it is fifteen percent. Id.
201. See GOLENPOLSKY, supra note 41, at 51.
202. See NICHOLAS D. KRISTOF & SHERYL WUDUNN, CHINA WAKEs 361 (1995).
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Russia has already become a major exporter of capital. Money that could
be invested in factories, services, or infrastructure at home, is instead
invested abroad. Much of the capital is dirty money, being sheltered abroad
to protect Russian criminals fearing investigation. The Russian Interior
Ministry estimates that criminal groups and shell corporations export $1.5
billion a month to Western bank accounts.2" In May 1995, it was revealed
that the Russian mafia had funneled hundreds of millions of dollars into
Israeli banks, corporations, and the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange. 205 One
Israeli paper reported that Russian dirty money was the cause of a record
$9.5 billion foreign currency reserve reported by the Bank of Israel.
21
On the other hand, a great proportion of exported capital consists of
legitimate wealth, many from gas or oil monopolies. Much of this wealth
will likely return to Russia once the political and economic situation
stabilizes. 07 If the wealth returns, this "hot" money will pour into the vast
Russian market, much as 6migr6 Chinese capital from Taiwan, Hong Kong,
Indonesia, and the United States helped power the Chinese economic boom.
Some predict that, "[w]hen Russian 'hot' money is combined with Russia's
huge markets, it surely will create a great power on the world stage. "20s
2. Effects on Western Investment
Not surprisingly, corrupt nations - such as Russia - have difficulty
attracting much-needed foreign capital. One economist found that nations
that tolerate high levels of commercial corruption achieve five percent less
aggregate investment levels than non-corrupt societies and lose about half
a percentage point of GDP growth per year. 209 "The negative association
between corruption and investment, as well as growth, is significant, both
in a statistical and in an economic sense." 20  As CIA Director Deutch
According to the International Monetary Fund, Chinese sent $27.9 billion in 1992. Id. at
361-62. While some of the money returned, disguised as foreign investment, much of
remained in private foreign bank Id. at 362.
203. Id at 186-209. For a summary of commercial corruption in China, see Id.
204. John Deutch, supra note 194.
205. See Israel: Russian Mafia Invests Hundreds of Millions, ARAB PRESS SERVICE
DIPLOMATIC REP., May 20, 1995, available in LEXIS.
206. Id.
207. See GOLENPOLSKY, supra note 41, at 51.
208. Id. at 52.
209. See Kaufmann, supra note 191, at 119. See Mauro, supra note 191, at 683.
210. Mauro, supra note 190, at 683. "1 find that corruption lowers private investment,
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testified, "[t]he pervasiveness of crime and corruption in Russia and other
newly independent states make it difficult for U.S. and Western firms to do
business honestly in Russia ... such a business climate impedes the flow
of much-needed outside foreign investment to the Russian economy. "211
3. Non-Economic Effects
Pervasive crime also causes extensive social problems. Respect for
law enforcement and for government evaporates. Western investors, or
multinational institutions, such as law or consulting firms, have trouble
convincing their employees to relocate to such an environment. Social
instability grows, creating opportunities for civil unrest, or even coup
attempts. Perhaps worse, democracy becomes associated with lawlessness.
As a result, citizens lose interest in democratic procedures or find them
useless in solving their problems. A U.S. State Department report noted,
"[riampant crime undercuts the development of fledgling democratic
institutions, and allows criminal groups, rather than the citizenry, to
become strong enough to become the ultimate brokers of power."2"
4. Effects on the United States and Europe
Russian commercial crime impacts neighboring countries and the
world. According to John Deutch, Director of the CIA, "Russian crime
groups have spread rapidly beyond the former Soviet borders and have a
presence in up to 50 countries." 2 3 A report released by the Attorney
General of California in March 1996 showed that Russian organized crime
was an increasing threat to California's public safety. 2 14 The report showed
that through sophisticated tax fraud schemes, Russian criminal syndicates
had bilked governments out of $2 billion a year.215 According to this
report, Russian expatriate criminal organizations are engaged in a variety
thereby reducing economic growth, even in subsamples of countries in which bureaucratic
regulations are very cumbersome." Id.
211. John Deutch, supra note 193.
212. Crime in the New Independent States, supra note 185.
213. John Deutch, supra note 193.
214. See Lungren Says Russian Organized Crime Is Growing Threat to State,




of criminal operations, including drug trafficking, money laundering, auto
theft, prostitution, and extortion." 6
V. ATTEMPS AT CURBING ECONOMIC & COMMERCIAL CRIME
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, various administrations
under President Yeltsin have embarked on economic reform programs
designed to turn the Russian Federation into a free-market, democratic
society. The process has been slow and uneven. Perhaps the central issue
of post-Communist economic life has been the continued monopolization of
the "means of production" in various key sectors, and the attempts by
various reform administrations to undo the monopolies through
privatization, price deregulation, the creation of a system of private
property rights, and foreign investment.
A. Government Efforts At Controlling Corruption
Crime fighting has always been a vocal priority of post-Soviet
administrations. In February 1993, Boris Yeltsin declared, "organized
crime has become a direct threat to Russia's strategic interests and national
security. "I" Since then numerous anti-corruption initiatives have been put
forward, only to slowly peter out. A 1992 Presidential ukase2' (or decree)
forbade all civil servants from exploiting their office for commercial gain.
However, the vagueness of the decree and the breadth of institutionalized
corruption undermined the effectiveness of the decree.
President Yeltsin attempted to make anti-corruption a theme of his
1996 Presidential campaign, at one point promising to "pound the stuffing
out of bribers in Russia." 219 After Yeltsin's election, the appointment of
General Alexander Lebed as national security advisor in June 1996 was
thought to signal a serious effort to tackle corruption. But Lebed's fall
shortly thereafter ended his "Truth and Order" campaign even before it had
begun. 220  Boris Nemtsov later made anti-corruption part of a longer
216. Id.
217. Russia's Mafia, supra note 147, at 19.
218. Ukase of the President of the Russian Federation: On the Fight Against Crime in the
Civil Service System, Ross. GAZETA, 7 Apr. 1992.
219. Marshall Ingwerson, Russia's New Head Cop Aims His Broom at Graft Among Elite,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, June 27, 1996, at 6.
220. Boris Yeltsin: "We must pound the stuffing out of bribers in Russia, "CURRENT DIG.
OF POST-SOVIET PRESS, May 29, 1996, at 12.
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strategy of liberalizing the economy. At the Parliamentary level, Vladimir
Volkov, a member of the Defense Committee of the State Duma, began
drafting a proposed military policy law in February 1997.221 It would
establish a pilot 5,000-person unit in the first year. Thereafter, if the test
unit is effective, the force would be expanded to a full anti-corruption
military police force of 27,000.222 Yet despite these and many similar
initiatives, corruption both within the business and political elite and in
society at large remains as intractable as ever.
B. Tax Reform
The byzantine nature of the Russian tax structure is one of the
principal sources of corruption, and appropriately the Russian government
(under intense pressure from Western governments and multinational
lenders) has attempted to reform the tax code. Stanley Fischer, an IMF
official, noted that nonpayment is routine, and overlapping tax levels often
drive rates to outright confiscatory levels.223 Special tax privileges and
loopholes contribute to the criminal activity. In May 1997, the withdrawal
of tax privileges for an Afghani veterans group led to a bombing that killed
fourteen people.224 Tax avoidance has also risen to new and perilous levels.
In 1996, twenty-six tax collectors were killed and seventy-four injured
while carrying out their official duties; six were kidnaped, while another
forty-one had their homes burned down.225 Stanley Fischer further noted,
"the revenue picture has been nothing short of calamitous [with non-
payment getting worse] it will not be possible to continue to keep a stable
economy or to continue rational policies unless this [tax] issue is dealt
with. "226
221. See Simon Saradzhyan, Russia: Military Declares War On Crime In Its Ranks, Radio
Free Europe/Radio Liberty (visited Nov. 5, 1998) <http:www.rferl.org/nca/features/
1997/02/F.RU.970221145015.html >.
222. Id.
223. See Robert Lyle, Russia.: 'Fix the Tax System!' say Moscow and Washington, Radio
Free Europe/Radio Liberty (visited Nov. 5, 1998) <http:www.referl.org/nca/features/
1997/04/F.RU.970402152114.html >.
224. See Disappearing Taxes: The Tap Runs Dry, ECONOMIST, May 31, 1997, at 21.
225. Id.




1. Anti-bribery Restrictions Under the Criminal Code
Bribery restrictions exist in Russia law but are usually dealt with under
the laws against corruption. "Corruption" is a vague term in Russian
jurisprudence and encompasses several crimes under the Russian Criminal
Code.227 Article 147(2)(2) criminalizes, "illegal appropriation of state
property with selfish goals in favor of the culprit or other culprits through
abuse of office.' ' 228  Article 175(1) notes corruption as that which,
"violat[es] anti-monopoly legislation. "229 In 1996, 3,504 criminal cases
were filed on corruption charges, an increase of 30.8 percent over the
previous year. 30
2. Weaknesses in Russian Anti-bribery Enforcement
a. Vague and Unenforceable Anti-bribery Legislation
Current anti-bribery legislation is wholly ineffective for several
reasons. First, the legislation is rarely enforced, and when it is enforced is
done so for political reasons. Second, anti-corruption campaigns are
hampered by vague and self-defeating legal provisions.23' Under the
current regulations, only government officials can be tried for bribery,
while those engaged in private business are immune from prosecution.232
Therefore, the bribee may be tried (if caught) but the briber can not.
Fighting only the demand for corruption but not the supply has had
predictably poor results. According to one Interior Minister, the police
solve less than one percent of official bribery cases, even though bribery is
by far the most widespread commercial crime. 233  Further, there is no
clear-cut legal definition of bribery, which hinders prosecution of even
those few who are caught. For this reason, no one can be held guilty of
fraudulent business activities, of failure to repay loans or government
227. Interior Ministry Press Briefing Regarding the Control of Corruption, OFFICIAL
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credits, or of misuse of funds."' As a result, not only bribery, but also
money laundering, fraud, and false advertising go virtually unpunished.23
b. Police Corruption
Third, corruption has pervaded the very institutions that are ostensibly
set up to combat it. The police force in Russia is thoroughly corrupt.
23 6
The chief of Moscow's police force estimated in 1994 that nintey percent
of his policemen were "on the take. ,237 The national traffic police, or GAI,
who are posted at every major intersection are especially corrupt, often
stopping motorists for minor or nonexistent infractions and collecting
on-the-spot cash fines. 238  As a sign of the ubiquity of bribery and the
inability - or unwillingness - of the police to address it, consider the
report that when Interior Minister Anatoly Kulikov sent a truck carrying
vodka around Russia to measure police corruption, Kulikov found that
police demanded bribes at twenty-two of twenty-four police checkpoints.239
c. Judicial and Prosecutorial Corruption
Fourth, the judiciary is equally corrupt .20 Almost all judges are
carryovers from the Communist regime; they have no experience in
administering a Rechstaat, and now use their position for self-enrichment.
Yuri Boldyrev, who was briefly the government's chief investigator into
corruption, succinctly stated that the decay in state and public institutions,
"goes beyond the limits of the imagination." 24' In October of 1992, an
Interior Ministry chief was arrested for bribery.242 When his home was
searched nearly $500,000 in cash was found.2 43 In February 1996, Alexei
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. See Russia's Mafia, supra note 147, at 19.
237. Id.
238. See Clara Germani, Business As Usual: Bribery Accepted, Jeered in Russia Old
Tradition Enters New Era, BALTIMORE SUN, Oct. 15, 1995, at A33.
239. See James P. Gallagher, Yeltsin Targets Corruption, Cm. TREB., Dec. 26, 1995, at
14.
240. Russia's Mafia, supra note 147, at 19.





Ilyushenko, Russia's former top law enforcement official, was charged with
bribery and abuse of power. 2"
In short, corruption has thoroughly permeated Russia's civic
institutions, rendering enforcement of much anti-corruption legislation
impossible. According to CIA Director Deutch, "it's truly impossible in
many instances to differentiate between Russian organized crime and the
Russian state. "245 Not surprisingly, citizens are loathe to involve the police
in disputes. Russia's prosecutor-general estimated that two out of three
crimes went unreported. 2" Many victims of commercial crime, both
Russians and Westerners, refuse to report crimes that have been committed
against them because they believe that police and prosecutors are involved
in the criminal underworld.247  Consequently, commercial crimes,
including, but not limited to bribery and graft, are recognized as an
unavoidable cost of business. In the vast majority of instances, the cost of
business crime is simply left "off the books," unreported, or ignored.
D. Antitrust as A Weapon Against Corruption
One potential tool against corruption is the establishment of an
antitrust, or competition policy, possibly one modeled along the lines of the
United States. Under Soviet socialism, the pervasiveness of rules, and the
enormous degree of discretion given to bureaucrats to create, produce, or
interpret regulations, allowed corruption to flourish.248 Much of this system
remains in place. Indeed, to a large degree, the criminalization of business
has occurred due to ex-Soviet bureaucrats becoming involved with
organized crime. 249  "[I]nstead of corruption being the grease for the
squeaky wheels of a rigid administration, it becomes the fuel for excessive
and discretionary regulations. "250
244. Russia's Former Prosecutor Charged With Bribery, REUTERS N. AM. WIRE, Feb.
23, 1996, available in LEXIS.
245. John Deutch, supra note 193.
246. Russia: Money Kills, ECONOMIST, Nov. 16, 1996, at 51.
247. Gallagher, supra note 239, at 14.
248. See Kaufmann, supra note 191, at 116.
249. See HANDELMAN, supra note 51, at 69. "The relaxation of the command-
administrative system had done little more than allow enterprising apparatchiks and black
marketeers to convert the wealth they earned through the manipulation of the system into
'real' money." Id.
250. Kaufmann, supra note 191, at 116.
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1. The Economic Relationship Between Corruption and Antitrust
Regardless of whether it occurs in established economies or emerging
markets, bribery and other forms of commercial corruption destroy or
undermine competition.25 ' As one expert points out, whether made by an
inefficient firm or an efficient firm that intends to reap monopoly prices,
"the bribes very purpose is to avoid competition and thereby maintain
higher prices (or poorer quality). 25 2 Regardless of the circumstances,
bribery levies an additional tax on business which is eventually passed onto
consumers, directly through higher costs or indirectly through slower
growth.253 Simply put, the purpose of bribery and other corrupt practice is
to avoid the chastening mechanism of the market, and therefore wherever
it occurs, it is ipso facto anti-competitive. Implementing a vigorous and
effective competition policy is necessary to fight the very conditions that
make corruption possible.
2. Monopolization as a Basis for Russia's Economic Problem
Greater use of antitrust is especially pressing in Russia, because
extreme monopolization has been instrumental in creating the conditions for
corruption and bribery to exist. President Kuchma of Ukraine pointed to
the establishment of "state rackets" based on criminal use of monopoly
power.25 4  "Bribery and corruption have become integral attributes of
certain state institutions and organizations," he argued, 255 "Those most
encumbered with power in fact turned their state authorities and state
property into a means of personal enrichment .... Whole semi-criminal
clans appeared on this soil monopolizing individual sectors of the economy
[and] seriously influencing all layers of state authority. "256 Arguably, only
251. See Franklin Gevurtz, Commercial Bribery and the Sherman Act: The Case for Per
Se Illegality, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 365, 373 (1987). Where a bribe is given to create a
monopoly, the nexus with antitrust is clear. Id. Usually however, bribery would not
produce such a drastic impact on the market. Id. "Indeed, it may only affect one sale." Id.
at 374. Yet some economists have shown that even in oligopoly conditions, bribery is still
a restraint to trade. Bribonomics: Does Corruption Slow Growth?, ECONOMIST, Mar. 19,
1994, at 86.
252. Gevurtz, supra note 251, at 391.
253. Id.
254. Kuchma on Need to Fight "Fifth Power" of Shadow Economy and Illegal Wealth,





the creation of a competitive market economy, with free enterprises
operating within a stable rule of law, will break down the old state
monopolies.
Antitrust is well suited to this purpose. One expert notes, "[a]s price
regulation is removed, and privatization of enterprises continues, the need
for establishing a set of rules of conduct covering the behavior of firms
becomes increasingly apparent."257
3. Russian Antitrust Law
a. Anti-monopoly Committees
The foundation of antitrust law in Russia is the "Law on Competition
and Limitation of Monopolistic Activity in Goods Market" adopted by the
Supreme Soviet in March 1991. 258 The law was applicable to all goods and
services traded in Russia, with the exception of financial markets, for which
there is no comparable legislation. After the dissolution of the Soviet
Union, the Yeltsin administrations of the Russian Federation have continued
the legal efforts by creating Anti-Monopoly Committees ("AMCs") in each
region and one state AMC. 259 A decree "On the State Committee of the
Russian Federation for Antimonopoly Policy and Support of New Economic
Structures" issued August 24, 1992 set out to make the state AMC "the
central organ of the executive power of the Russian Federation" for
antitrust issues. 2 ° This body is responsible for implementing state policy
regarding antimonopoly issues, limiting monopolistic activity, preventing
unfair competition, and protecting consumer rights.26 ' To this end, the state
AMC was given sweeping powers. 62 Separate AMCs exist in the
257. Rose Anne Devlin & Sylianos Perrakis, Legislating Competition Policy in the
Russian Federation: A New Challenge for Antitrust Policy, ANTITRUST BULL. Dec. 22,
1995, at 901-02.
258. Id. at 902.
259. Id. at 903. See also Law of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic On
Competition and Restriction of Monopolistic Activities in Commodity Markets, Art. 3,
reprinted in TRADE & COMMERCIAL LAWS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION: OFFICIAL
CODIFICATION & COMMENTARY (1994) [hereinafter "RSFSR Antimonopoly Law"].
260. See Russia to Establish Legal Framework to Enforce Antitrust Matters, Control
Monopolies, RUSSIAN & COMMONWEALTH BUS. L. REP., Oct. 16, 1992.
261. Id.
262. Id. Enumerated powers included:
the authority to break up [enterprises] that occupy a dominant position in
the market and engage in monopolistic activity; submitting proposals to
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eighty-eight regions that comprise the Russian Federation.263 Regional
AMCs implement local measures, while the state AMC formulates national
policies and oversees the local boards.2 64
b. Antitrust Provisions that Relate to Commercial Corruption
The purpose of Russian antitrust policy is to promote free
competition.26 According to the Law of the Russian Soviet Federated
Socialist Republic On Competition and Restriction of Monopolistic
Activities in Commodity Markets ("RSFSR Antimonopoly Law")
"competition" is defined as "the contest between proprietary entities in
which their independent activities effectively curtail the ability to influence
the general conditions of a particular market and stimulate the production
of goods and the supply of services."
26
The RSFSR Antimonopoly Law is designed to prevent any firm from
achieving a "dominant position on the market." To this end, Article 5 lists
certain activities that are per se abuses of dominant market position.267
While corrupt practices are not specifically enumerated, the Criminal Code
does criminalize, "monopolistic actions committed by means of the
establishment of monopolistically high or monopolistically low prices, and
likewise the limitation of competition by means of dividing the market,
appropriate government agencies for prohibiting or terminating
export-import operations of enterprises that violate anti-monopoly
legislation; authority to restrict and prohibit monopolistic activites and
unfair competition; monitoring compliance with legislation for the
protection of consumer rights; enforcement of antimonopoly legislation;
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266. Id. at art. 4.
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limitation of access to the market.. ,2 The provision is clearly
intended to encompass a broad range of impermissible activities.
Without doubt, commercial corruption could be used to restrict
competition, and thus could fall within the general prohibitions of the
Antimonopoly Policy. Indeed, in February 1996, the state AMC found
PepsiCo Inc. guilty of misappropriation and theft of trade secrets from
American Medical.269 The state AMC also made known its intention in July
1996, to amend Russia's consumer rights law to include financial
institutions within the Antimonopoly Policy.270 Other new provisions could
protect consumers from bank fraud and corruption within the Russian
banking system by forcing banks to reveal more information about credit
policies before signing up for loans.271 This could be especially useful
given the nexus between Russian crime and the banking system.
Nevertheless, experts point out that formidable obstacles still lie in the way
of the effective implementation of competition policy in this previously
monopolized regime.272 Without properly understanding the state's role in
the economy "Russia risks being mired in this economic no-man's-land
between a centrally planned system and a fully functioning market
economy," noted IMF Director Camdessus.273
E. Privatization and Corruption
A related strategy in de-monopolizing Russia's economy, and thus
removing the preconditions for commercial corruption, has been removing
assets from state control through privatization. Privatization began as, "a
pragmatic struggle to restore order and legitimacy to a transition market,
where the state bureaucrats and politicians would have less control over the
enterprise sector. "274 At the time, it was believed rapid privatization had
268. Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, art. 178, Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1996, No.
25 [weekly], Art. No. 2954, reprinted and translated in WILLIAM E. BUTLER, CRIMINAL
CODE OFTHE RUSSIAN FEDERATION 104(1997). See also RSFSR Antimonopoly Law, supra
note 259, art. 10.
269. See American Medical Clinics Inc.: Russian Panel Finds PepsiCo Guilty in
Trade-Secret Suit, WALL ST. J., Feb. 27, 1996, at 4.
270. Alexei Smirnov, More Bank Data Due Clients, Moscow TIMES, July 19, 1996,
available in LEXIS.
271. Id.
272. See Devlin & Perrakis, supra note 257, at 903.
273. Russia Weighs Price of Privatization, FINANCIAL TIMES, May 9, 1997, at 2.
274. Daniel Kaufmann & Paul Siegelbaum, Privatization & Corruption in Transition
Economies, J. INT'L AFFAIRS, Winter 1997, at 419, 425.
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become necessary. 2" However, well before formal strategies of reform
took place, a process of "spontaneous privatization" began to occur
whereby well-placed functionaries stole state assets and revenue and
funneled these assets abroad.276 The privatization program, originally
headed by Anatoly Chubais, proceeded through several stages. In the fall
of 1992, vouchers were issued to Russian citizens.277 The vouchers could
then be used in auctions for state enterprises, at which approximately
twenty percent of the shares of any enterprises would be exchanged for
vouchers. 278 The privatization of factories began in 1992, and within
eighteen months "voucher" privatization was complete.2 79 By then, over
eighty percent of Russian industry had been privatized.28 °
Privatization and corruption have been related phenomena in
post-Soviet economic transition.28 ' Until recently, the general wisdom was
that market reforms in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, which
had followed the Revolutions of 1989-1990, caused the explosion of crime
and corruption. The Interior Ministry reported 1,700 privatization crimes
in 1996, 880 of which went to trial. 282 The Ministry was investigating
seventy-four cases in 1997, many of them involving top government
officials. 3 One scam involved state officials selling properties at far less
than their value in return for kickbacks. 2 4 A metallurgical factory in
Magnitogorsk was sold by a group of investors for 300 million rubles.285
A court vacated the sale when it appraised the property to be valued at 22
billion rubles. 286 The Russian Interior Ministry recently created a special
275. LAYARD & PARKER, supra note 22, at 126.
276. Kaufmann & Siegelbaum, supra note 274, at 424.
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task force to combat crimes arising from the privatization of state
property.281
The dismantling of the centralized state has allowed many of the
nomenclatura to use their positions to enrich themselves. Yet, on the other
hand, it is increasingly apparent that the spread of commercial crime in
Russia is a result, not of free market reforms, but rather of free market
reforms not being carried far enough. One economic study found,
"[h]alf-baked, poorly designed, inadequately implemented market reforms
may indeed boost corruption. Well designed and properly executed market
reforms do not. "288
Nevertheless, it is equally true that "spontaneous privatization," and
subsequent illegalities, resulted in the unjust enrichment of many, including
many servants of the old regime.289 Jeffrey Sachs, the Harvard economist
who was one of the key architects of "shock therapy" in Poland and Russia,
believes that Russia's natural gas resources were essentially stolen from the
Russian people through questionable privatization decisions, and that the
gas giant Gazprom ought to be renationalized. 2 ° Yet despite this and other
abuses, further attempts at divesting the government of state assets remain
the best corrective to the abuse of the privatization process.
VI. CONCLUSION: JOINT VENTURES IN RUSSIA - PLANNING FOR THE
CORRUPT MARKET
The currency crisis of 1998 may spell the end of Western investment
in Russia for some time to come. And it may not. Either way, many
multinational corporations have already made substantial investments in
Russia and will attempt to ride out the current storm. Others - some
brave, others reckless - will continue to do business in Russia despite the
current turmoil. The experiences of Western investors provide objective
lessons for future investors on how to prosper (or at least survive) in the
potentially lucrative, large, and corrupt Russian market.
287. Id..
288. Kaufmann, supra note 191, at 122.
289. Kaufmann & Siegelbaum, supra note 274, at 454. "The theft of assets effectively
started, in fact, a few years before communism fell." Id. "Following the break-up, the
state's assets were being stolen by enterprise managers, politicians, and bureaucrats at an
intolerable rate .... "Id.
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A. Lesson One: Avoid the Russian Legal System
As a general rule, Western investors are strongly recommended to
avoid structuring their investments under Russian law. 29' Instead, to the
extent possible, investors should seek to define their legal relationships
under their respective foreign legislation, and then spell out in detail the
legal relationships between the Russian and Western partners in joint
venture or operating agreements. 292 "[L]aws exist in Russia," recommends
one Western investment guide, "but you are recommended to use them only
after consulting with an appropriate authorized official. ,293 Better yet is to
avoid using them at all.
B. Lessons from Semtek: Find an Honest Partner
As in many developing markets, the choice of business entity or
formal legal guarantees are worth much less than Western investors expect
in their home countries. One American corporation, Semtek International
Inc., recently discovered this aspect of Russian business life to its
detriment."M Semtek embarked on a fifty-fifty joint venture with Merkuriy
Ltd., Russia's largest communications satellite maker. 95 Semtek was to
secure financing while Merkuriy was to provide the satellites and support
staff. Together the joint venture would lease military satellites to private
companies.296 Despite signing various documents, including letters of intent
and a detailed protocol spelling out the terms of their joint venture, the
Russian businessmen suddenly dumped Semtek in favor of Lockheed
Martin, with whom Merkuiry was conducting parallel negotiations. 29
Semtek then sued Merkuriy winning a default judgment of $381 million.298
The judgment was then set aside because Merkuriy was not given proper
notice under international law standards. 299
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Semtek began pursuing its complaint against Merkuriy and its director,
Pyotr Sivirin, through letters rogatory while also bringing suit against
Lockheed Martin ("Lockheed"). On February 26, 1997 Semtek sued
Lockheed Martin in Los Angeles Superior Court for breach of contract,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent interference with
economic advantage, and conspiracy to interfere with prospective economic
advantage, all under California law. 'I Lockheed removed the suit to the
Central District of California, which subsequently dismissed Semtek's
claims based on California's two-year statute of limitations.3 °0  (On
February 25, 1999, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed this
decision.)3"2
Semtek responded by suing Lockheed in Baltimore City Circuit Court
for the same four causes of action, but hoping to take advantage of
Maryland's three-year statute of limitations. 3 03 On July 24, 1997 Lockheed
filed a notice to remove the case to U.S. District Court.304 Semtek moved
to remand to the Circuit Court, claiming a lack of federal jurisdiction. That
remand was granted on December 31, 1997, where the case awaits trial.3°5
The outcome of Semtek's international claims against Merkuriy and its
Maryland state law claims against Lockheed remain to be seen. Regardless,
Semtek's foray into the Russian business world did not prove as successful
as anticipated.
As Semtek discovered, formal legal guarantees often do not count in
the wild West of Russian business. In Russia, as in China, guanxi or
"connections" are far more important than formal legal strictures to
successful business in Russia. Choosing an honest, industrious business
partner is therefore far more important than the legal entity chosen, letters
of intent, or meticulously drafted contracts. The U.S. Embassy in Moscow
notes, "you can do business in Russia without a formal legal partner or joint
venture, though you cannot do it without a multitude of informal
partners. ",30 Doing Business in Russia, an investment guide to the New
Russia puts it bluntly: "Russia is still a country where business can't exist
300. See Semtak Intern., Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 988 F. Supp. 913,914 (D.Md.
1997), aff'd, No. 97-55840, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 3150, at *2 (Feb. 25, 1999).
301. Id.
302. Semtek Intern., Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., No. 97-55840, 1999 U.S. App.
LEXIS 3150, at *2 (Feb. 25, 1999).
303. Semtek, 988 F. Supp. 914.
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. Working With Russian Business Partners, supra note 105.
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independently of those in power. No one can point out a single case of
successful foreign capital investment in Russia that prospered without direct
or indirect participation of local authorities or state administration
bureaucrats in one way or another. 
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C. Lesson Three: Avoid Corrupt Business Practices
1. Perils of Tolerating Corrupt Practices
Corrupt practices are a way of business life in Russia. Unless they are
extremely fortunate, corporations that enter the Russian market will be
faced with a dilemma: to "play the game" and tolerate or engage in the
practices this paper has discussed, or to stand aloof. Virtue may be its own
reward, but in the Russian market, the refusal to conform to the norms of
Russian business culture may hinder an honest business from succeeding,
or even from getting started. Corporations have successfully invested in
corrupt markets while adamantly refusing to go along with questionable
commercial practices. When Colgate-Palmolive invested in Guangdong
province, China, for example, company officials steadfastly and vocally
publicized the corporation's refusal to countenance bribery. 308 Their verve
paid off. Colgate-Palmolive was able to open a $20 million dollar factory
without any questionable payments.
Of course, for every honest business that succeeds there are countless
that fail. Corporations that choose to tolerate a low-level of corruption to
survive in Russia must be aware of the possible consequences. First, a
general dynamic that has been observed throughout the world is that bribery
begets bribery. That is, corporations that pay bribes in order to secure
business are typically hounded thereafter by other individuals or entities
demanding more bribes. Companies or executives, perhaps under pressure
to get the deal done and with little or no guidance from higher level
executives back home, may feel pressured to make an illicit payment "just
once" to overcome a rough patch in negotiations or to close a deal. The
reality is that one payment soon becomes several, and corporations soon
find themselves in a downward spiral of escalating payments (and possibly
even a growing cast of characters).
.307. GOLENPOLSKY, supra note 41, at 39.
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2. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
American corporations who tolerate bribery face the further threat of
federal prosecution. While payments in most of the world are considered
a routine cost of business (the French export insurance program,
Compagnie Francaise d'Assurance pour le Commerce Exterieur, or
COFACE, for example, covers foreign bribery as export risk)3"' American
corporations risk violating the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act ("FCPA").1
Generally, the FCPA prohibits payments by Americans to foreign officials
in order to obtain or retain business.31 2 The FCPA prohibits direct
payments to foreign officials, or payments by third persons, when these
payments are used to influence any act or decision of the foreign official in
his official capacity.313 The FCPA also prohibits direct payments used to
induce a foreign official to act or refrain from acting in violation of the
official's duty.314 Finally, the FCPA prohibits payments used to induce a
foreign official to use his or her influence with a foreign government or
agency to influence its decision making.31 5 In addition to prohibiting illicit
payments, the FCPA requires that entities required to report to the
Securities and Exchange Commission (generally public companies) must
maintain certain financial records in order to be able to detect such
payments. 
31 6
The FCPA is in many respects a vague statute, and because so many
of the investigations of illicit payments result in consent decrees, there is
little case law (especially at the appellate level) explaining or clarifying its
provisions. Compliance is further complicated for corporations in Russia.
One observer noted, "U.S. companies working in a country like Russia face
dilemmas that are difficult to resolve as a result of the ambiguities
310. See Folsom & GORDON, supra note 109, at 335.
311. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b), 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78ff (1988) (originally enacted as Pub. L. No.
95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977), and amended by Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Amendments
of 1988, Pub.L. No. 100-418, §§ 5001-5003, 102 Stat. 1107, 1415-25).
312. The FCPA (and its 1988 amendments) amended the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-7811 (1982), making it unlawful for any issuer of securities
registered under Section 12 of that Act, 15 U.S.C. § 781, or an issuer required to file reports
according to Section 15(d) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78(o)d, to make (with some
exceptions) payments to foreign officials in order to obtain or retain business. For a general
survey of the FCPA see FoLsoM & GORDON, supra note 109, at 312-37.
313. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(a)(1)(A)(i).
314. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(a)(1)(A)(ii).
315. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(a)(1)(B).
316. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A)-(B).
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surrounding the FCPA. Their problems are compounded by the frustration
of knowing that other Western, Asian, and local investors are not bound by
laws similar to the FCPA."
317
For example, only payments to "foreign officials" are criminalized
under the FCPA, not payments made to foreign businessmen. In the
chaotic world of post-communist Russia, in which privatization is ongoing
and in many respects never fully developed, who is an "official" and who
is not?31I As one observer pointed out, "[u]ntil recently, the Soviet Union
and other communist states fully managed every aspect of their countries'
economies and, therefore, employees of all entities were technically
'foreign officials' under the FCPA. ,,319 Since many of the functionaries of
the Soviet regime are still in positions of power, and the lines between
privatized corporations and government controlled agencies remains in
many cases blurred, clarifying who is or is not an "official" can be a very
uncertain exercise - one with potentially expensive results.32O
Similarly, American corporations can be held liable for illicit
payments of their agents, vendors, or subsidiaries in Russia if they make
payments to these third parties "while knowing" that the ultimate recipient
of the money will be a foreign official. 321 "Knowing" is a defined term
under the FCPA, but in many respects it is an unclear standard322 that has
317. Agnieszka Klich, Bribery in Economies in Transition: The Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act, 32 STAN. J. INT'L L. 121, 122 (1996).
318. See Christopher F. Dugan and Vladimir Lechtman, Current Development: the FCPA
in Russia and Other Former Communist Countries, 91 AM. J. INT'L.. 378, 384-85 (1997).
319. Klich, supra note 317, at 134.
320. See Dugan & Lechtman, supra note 318, at 382.
321. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(a)(3)(1998).
322. §78dd-l(f)(2) of the Act specifies:
(A) A person's state of mind is "knowing" with respect to conduct, [if]:
(i) such person is aware that such person is engaging in such conduct
•.or conduct, that such circumstance exists, or that such result is
substantially certain to occur; or
(ii) such person has a firm belief that such circumstance exists or is
substantially substantially certain to occur.
(B) When knowledge of the existence of a particular circumstance is
required for an offense, such knowledge is established if a person is
aware of a high probability of the existence of such circumstance,
unless the person actually believes that such circumstance does not
exist.
15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(f)(2)(A)-(B). In the 1988 amendments to the FCPA, Congress warned
against a "head in the sand" attitude by U.S. corporations and cautioned against "conscious
disregard" of indications of a high likelihood of a violation. H.R.C ONF. REP. 576, 100th
CONG. 2d SEss. 918-20 (1988). Thus, an American corporation that is willfully blind or
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generated uncertain results and does not give entities operating abroad a
clear standard of what level of knowledge is required to be found liable
under the Act.323 Given the prevalence of illicit payments by agents or
vendors in Russia, American corporations employing third parties
potentially face a tremendous amount of potential liability. Finally, there
is no bright-line rule as to what is and is not a "corrupt" payment under the
FCPA. While payments to obtain or retain business are illegal, so called
"grease" or "facilitating" payments are not.32 4  These and other
uncertainties add a new and unwelcome level of potential liability under the
FCPA to American corporations operating in Russia.
D. Capitalism or Corruption - What Does the Future Hold for Russia?
Russia is a land of great potential. It is also a land of great problems,
foremost of which has been the high level of criminal activity and its
negative economic effects. What does the future hold? Will the Russian
government tackle the problem of commercial corruption, thus removing
the chief impediment to a Russian economic chudo? Or will Russia enter
the next millennium much as it left it; struggling internally with the arduous
process of reconstruction, the state apparatus powerless to reign in the
rapaciousness of the criminal class? Much rides on the resolution of this
question, both for Russia and the world.
As this Article has set forth, the criminalization of social and business
life that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union has had far reaching and
profound effects, both for Russia and the world community. The scope of
the problem is daunting and, especially recently, does not lend itself to
consciously avoids learning whether or not its foreign agent is violating the FCPA is
probably in violation.
323. FOLSOM & GORDON, supra note 109, at 323-24.
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"expedite or to secure the performance of a routine governmental action." 15 U.S.C. §
78dd-l(b). Such allowable "routine governmental actions" are defined as:
1. obtaining permits, licenses or other official documents to qualify a
person to do business in a foreign country;
2. processing governmental papers, such as visas and work orders;
3. providing police protection, mail pick-up and delivery, or scheduling
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to transit of goods across country;
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optimistic forecasts. And yet, despite the turmoil of recent months (and
perhaps because of it), optimism is called for. First, there is some evidence
that the scope of the crime epidemic that followed the end of the Soviet
Union is anomalous. Some believe the government is beginning to control
the situation.32 Though Russian statistics are notoriously slippery, one
estimate maintains that the crime rate was flat in 1993, and has since fallen
five percent in 1996 and nine percent in the first nine months of 1997.326
And it is possible that the shock of August 1998 may perhaps jolt the
government into coping with commercial crime.
In short, there are reasons for hope even amidst the current state of
pessimism and despair. Russia's problems, though serious, are
surmountable. "A new era has begun," one noted Russia watcher believes,
"Russia has entered the world, and everything, even freedom, even
happiness, is possible.
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